A key to the development of a wholly intellectual branch of legal knowledge, as opened up by the proactive role undertaken by the Supreme Court of India, engaging in the much appreciated and acclaimed era of judicial activism stems from the innovative exercise of interpreting various important provisions of the constitution in light of a presumed availability of due process. This, despite the fact, that any direct reference to the concept itself is conspicuously absent in the constitutional text. However, judicial interpretation of the constitution has provided a deep insight into the necessity and the veracity of incorporating a due process regime in our legal system.
A past constitutional reality – Rejection of Due Process or a balanced forethought of functional reality
Constitutional historian Prof. Granville Austin provides us with a veritable account of the ‘incorporation’ of due process in the constitution of India. In his distinguished book, ‘The Indian Constitution - Cornerstone of a Nation’, he discusses at length the assembly’s efforts at limiting the influence of due process in the new constitution. Due process in the constituent assembly was the subject matter of intense debate on two grounds, firstly with property acquisition and the consequent determination of compensation and secondly, preventive detention. Primarily the issue of property was sought to be resolved by excluding the term property from Article 21. Corrections made to Article 31 also ensured that, the determination of compensation would be left to the legislature and the power of the court to review the same was severely restricted. The very first amendment to the said article inserted Articles 31A and 31B along with the ninth schedule, which further alienated the courts by taking away, property acquisition and compensation from under the purview of Articles 14 and 19 as well.
It was also observed by the Fundamental Rights advisory committee that insofar as the applicability of due process to arrest and detention was concerned, the executive would not be empowered to detain any person without a trial. Even though such a restriction on arbitrary executive fiat was a welcome addition, certain other reasons impeded the incorporation of due process in its entirety. Certain key members of the assembly had at the time been greatly influenced by the works of a great American lawyer named James Bradley Thayer, who insisted that there must exist a distinction between legislation and adjudication in terms of preventing the judiciary from usurping the power by replacing the democratic value choices with that of their own. He believed that any absolute reliance on due process as a tool to safeguard against legislative oversight and executive fiat would weaken the democratic process (as acknowledged and discussed in ‘Originalism in American Law and Politics’ by Johnathan George O'Neill at p44). This view was supplemented by Justice Felix Frankfurter who suggested to Sir BN Rau, that an absolute incorporation of due process could not only be undemocratic but also be burdensome on the judiciary. Therefore it was widely acknowledged in the assembly that a balance should be achieved between protection of individual liberty against prejudicial action and safeguarding social reform legislation from the excesses of due process.
Due process was therefore intentionally omitted in favor of the Japanese ‘procedure established by law’, which largely ensured that social reform legislation would not be subject to the ‘excesses’ of due process and the demands of draft Article 15 (now Article 21), would be confined to procedure established by law, where law would be construed to mean legislation as opposed to natural law or natural justice. Owing to trenchant criticism on these grounds however the assembly adopted much later, a draft Article 15A (now Article 22), which provided further safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention with preventive detention being the exception rather than the norm.
The current definition of due process – A presumptive evolution or a justified reality
As an inherent aspect of modern American constitutionalism due process was incorporated through the Fifth Amendment to the American Constitution wherein it famously declares that no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law”. Therefore under the due process regime in the American legal system, any law depriving a person of his life, liberty, or property must stand the test of reasonableness wherein any deprivation of property would require a just compensation to be paid and wherein the deprivation of all liberties must stand test to the strict demands of reasonableness. Under the Indian Constitution, this was however, given up in the interests of a young developing nation seeking to achieve socio-economic reform. A shadow of due process however remained in the incorporation of the specific freedoms under Article 19 (1), the deprivation of which would be subject to just, fair and reasonable grounds only or the reluctant inclusion of Article 22 which was immediately the subject matter of fierce constitutional debate in the AK Gopalan’s case. The view therein expressed by the Supreme Court was however deeply discouraging to the proponents of a due process regime under the constitution of India. The issue in question was, the construction of article 22 based on standard rules of Constitutional interpretation. Rejecting the contentions of the petitioner, the Supreme Court upheld a narrow interpretation of both Articles 22 and 21 and ensured that they shall not be read in conjunction with Article 19 which would invariably lead on towards an indirect incorporation of due process into Article 21.
This view was finally acknowledged in the landmark judgment in Maneka Gandhi’s Case wherein it was held that Article 19 and Article 21 must be read in light of each other. This further strengthened the applicability of due process by appreciating the existence of a procedural due process within Article 21. The Supreme Court further acknowledged the existence of due process by declaring that Article 21 and 19 must be read in conjunction with Article 14 and as such it is now an accepted standard rule that any law depriving any person of his life or personal liberty would have to stand the test of reasonable restriction evolved by the Supreme Court under Article 19 and similarly any classification so depriving and class of people, any such right must stand the test of reasonableness of classification under Article 14. However, the true extent of this form of an evolved due process can only be appreciated upon an understanding of the interpretation of the terms, liberty and life as discussed in this judgment.
The illustrious bench decided to agree with the statement made by Justice Stephen J Field on the interpretation of the term life (By the term "life," as here used, something more is meant than mere animal existence) in his dissenting opinion in Munn V Illinois. As to the interpretation of the term liberty, though qualified by the term personal prefixed to it, the court held that, the term brought within its ambit, a variety of rights that contributed to the development of an individual's personality such as ‘freedom to travel abroad’. This view turned out to be of great significance inasmuch as the applicability of due process is concerned. Such a wide interpretation of the terms life and personal liberty under Article 21 when read in conjunction with the concept of reasonableness underlying Article 19, paved the way for interpreting into Article 21 the existence of a subtle and indirect applicability of substantive due process. The same has from then onwards been reflected in the various decisions of the Supreme Court; reading into Article 21(a provision obviously worded to be a procedural right), innumerable substantive rights like, right to privacy, right to livelihood, right to a clean and healthy environment and such other rights as being eligible for seeking protection against deprivation through the applicability of due process.
The rights to property however, suffered a set back in terms of the deletion of Article 19(1)(f), from part III. The significant development denying due process therein was however, the first amendment which inserted into part III, Articles 31A and 31B along with the ninth schedule. These new provisions sought to eliminate property from the ambit of due process in its entirety by excluding judicial review on the grounds of deprivation of Articles 14 or 19. However, post Maneka Gandhi decisions of the Supreme Court have ensured that all such legislations that are inserted into the ninth schedule remain open to review on the grounds of the nexus between their purposes and object being subject to judicial scrutiny.
The key to development however, lies in working of the law in relation to the current socio-economic and political scenario, rather than relying on expansive legal theories. Despite the noticeable difference in interpretation between the intention and the application of this principle, it is undeniable that the current socio-political situation demands a liberal approach to constitutional interpretation. However the question as regards with whether the situation would be any different with the standard interpretations can only be answered at this juncture with speculation and hypothesis. The latter could probably lead towards an undertaking of extensive research which would undoubtedly be of great practical significance.
Sreenidhi .K.R, M.L
A past constitutional reality – Rejection of Due Process or a balanced forethought of functional reality
Constitutional historian Prof. Granville Austin provides us with a veritable account of the ‘incorporation’ of due process in the constitution of India. In his distinguished book, ‘The Indian Constitution - Cornerstone of a Nation’, he discusses at length the assembly’s efforts at limiting the influence of due process in the new constitution. Due process in the constituent assembly was the subject matter of intense debate on two grounds, firstly with property acquisition and the consequent determination of compensation and secondly, preventive detention. Primarily the issue of property was sought to be resolved by excluding the term property from Article 21. Corrections made to Article 31 also ensured that, the determination of compensation would be left to the legislature and the power of the court to review the same was severely restricted. The very first amendment to the said article inserted Articles 31A and 31B along with the ninth schedule, which further alienated the courts by taking away, property acquisition and compensation from under the purview of Articles 14 and 19 as well.
It was also observed by the Fundamental Rights advisory committee that insofar as the applicability of due process to arrest and detention was concerned, the executive would not be empowered to detain any person without a trial. Even though such a restriction on arbitrary executive fiat was a welcome addition, certain other reasons impeded the incorporation of due process in its entirety. Certain key members of the assembly had at the time been greatly influenced by the works of a great American lawyer named James Bradley Thayer, who insisted that there must exist a distinction between legislation and adjudication in terms of preventing the judiciary from usurping the power by replacing the democratic value choices with that of their own. He believed that any absolute reliance on due process as a tool to safeguard against legislative oversight and executive fiat would weaken the democratic process (as acknowledged and discussed in ‘Originalism in American Law and Politics’ by Johnathan George O'Neill at p44). This view was supplemented by Justice Felix Frankfurter who suggested to Sir BN Rau, that an absolute incorporation of due process could not only be undemocratic but also be burdensome on the judiciary. Therefore it was widely acknowledged in the assembly that a balance should be achieved between protection of individual liberty against prejudicial action and safeguarding social reform legislation from the excesses of due process.
Due process was therefore intentionally omitted in favor of the Japanese ‘procedure established by law’, which largely ensured that social reform legislation would not be subject to the ‘excesses’ of due process and the demands of draft Article 15 (now Article 21), would be confined to procedure established by law, where law would be construed to mean legislation as opposed to natural law or natural justice. Owing to trenchant criticism on these grounds however the assembly adopted much later, a draft Article 15A (now Article 22), which provided further safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention with preventive detention being the exception rather than the norm.
The current definition of due process – A presumptive evolution or a justified reality
As an inherent aspect of modern American constitutionalism due process was incorporated through the Fifth Amendment to the American Constitution wherein it famously declares that no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law”. Therefore under the due process regime in the American legal system, any law depriving a person of his life, liberty, or property must stand the test of reasonableness wherein any deprivation of property would require a just compensation to be paid and wherein the deprivation of all liberties must stand test to the strict demands of reasonableness. Under the Indian Constitution, this was however, given up in the interests of a young developing nation seeking to achieve socio-economic reform. A shadow of due process however remained in the incorporation of the specific freedoms under Article 19 (1), the deprivation of which would be subject to just, fair and reasonable grounds only or the reluctant inclusion of Article 22 which was immediately the subject matter of fierce constitutional debate in the AK Gopalan’s case. The view therein expressed by the Supreme Court was however deeply discouraging to the proponents of a due process regime under the constitution of India. The issue in question was, the construction of article 22 based on standard rules of Constitutional interpretation. Rejecting the contentions of the petitioner, the Supreme Court upheld a narrow interpretation of both Articles 22 and 21 and ensured that they shall not be read in conjunction with Article 19 which would invariably lead on towards an indirect incorporation of due process into Article 21.
This view was finally acknowledged in the landmark judgment in Maneka Gandhi’s Case wherein it was held that Article 19 and Article 21 must be read in light of each other. This further strengthened the applicability of due process by appreciating the existence of a procedural due process within Article 21. The Supreme Court further acknowledged the existence of due process by declaring that Article 21 and 19 must be read in conjunction with Article 14 and as such it is now an accepted standard rule that any law depriving any person of his life or personal liberty would have to stand the test of reasonable restriction evolved by the Supreme Court under Article 19 and similarly any classification so depriving and class of people, any such right must stand the test of reasonableness of classification under Article 14. However, the true extent of this form of an evolved due process can only be appreciated upon an understanding of the interpretation of the terms, liberty and life as discussed in this judgment.
The illustrious bench decided to agree with the statement made by Justice Stephen J Field on the interpretation of the term life (By the term "life," as here used, something more is meant than mere animal existence) in his dissenting opinion in Munn V Illinois. As to the interpretation of the term liberty, though qualified by the term personal prefixed to it, the court held that, the term brought within its ambit, a variety of rights that contributed to the development of an individual's personality such as ‘freedom to travel abroad’. This view turned out to be of great significance inasmuch as the applicability of due process is concerned. Such a wide interpretation of the terms life and personal liberty under Article 21 when read in conjunction with the concept of reasonableness underlying Article 19, paved the way for interpreting into Article 21 the existence of a subtle and indirect applicability of substantive due process. The same has from then onwards been reflected in the various decisions of the Supreme Court; reading into Article 21(a provision obviously worded to be a procedural right), innumerable substantive rights like, right to privacy, right to livelihood, right to a clean and healthy environment and such other rights as being eligible for seeking protection against deprivation through the applicability of due process.
The rights to property however, suffered a set back in terms of the deletion of Article 19(1)(f), from part III. The significant development denying due process therein was however, the first amendment which inserted into part III, Articles 31A and 31B along with the ninth schedule. These new provisions sought to eliminate property from the ambit of due process in its entirety by excluding judicial review on the grounds of deprivation of Articles 14 or 19. However, post Maneka Gandhi decisions of the Supreme Court have ensured that all such legislations that are inserted into the ninth schedule remain open to review on the grounds of the nexus between their purposes and object being subject to judicial scrutiny.
The key to development however, lies in working of the law in relation to the current socio-economic and political scenario, rather than relying on expansive legal theories. Despite the noticeable difference in interpretation between the intention and the application of this principle, it is undeniable that the current socio-political situation demands a liberal approach to constitutional interpretation. However the question as regards with whether the situation would be any different with the standard interpretations can only be answered at this juncture with speculation and hypothesis. The latter could probably lead towards an undertaking of extensive research which would undoubtedly be of great practical significance.
Sreenidhi .K.R, M.L